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COMMENTS
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.: Defining
Sabbath Rights in the Workplace
Introduction
In June 1985, the United States Supreme Court held, in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,1 that an employee is not constitutionally enti-
tled to a day of rest on his or her designated day of worship. As a case
involving significant issues of free religious exercise and employment
rights, the opinion is remarkable for its brevity. Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion is barely seven pages in length; Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented without a written opinion. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Marshall, concurred in a separate opinion which offers useful advice to
future litigants in this area of first amendment rights.2
In Thornton, an employee's claimed right to worship freely by stay-
ing home from work on his chosen Sabbath-a right initially established
by state statute3 -was categorically rejected by the nation's highest court
in a few terse pages. How is such a result achieved in a country whose
founders arrived seeking the freedom to worship without government in-
trusion? This Comment seeks to answer that question.
Part I sets forth the facts and holding of Thornton. Part II examines
the development of federal constitutional law in this area. Part III ex-
plores Justice O'Connor's suggestion, in her concurrence, that federal
statutory law-specifically Title VII's employment discrimination stat-
ute--may provide relief where the constitution is unavailing.
This Comment concludes that federal constitutional law, hampered
by an absence of Supreme Court guidance concerning the interplay be-
tween the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses, does not offer a
viable solution at this time to the free exercise problem posed in Thorn-
ton.5 However, the federal employment discrimination statute, Title VII
1. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
2. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e (West 1983). See infra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
5. See infra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 provides a workable means for protect-
ing an employee's free exercise rights without running the risk of uncon-
stitutionally establishing religion.7 This Comment suggests that the
Supreme Court might employ the "reasonable accommodation" test cur-
rently used in the federal antidiscrimination law to resolve establish-
ment/free exercise conflicts in the area of employee rights."
I. The Facts and the Holding
A. Facts
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,' petitioner's decedent, Thorn-
ton, began working for Caldor (a large department store) in early 1975.
In 1976, the Connecticut legislature revised its Sunday closing statutes. 0
In 1977, Caldor opened its Connecticut stores for Sunday business.
Thornton, then a department manager, complied with his employer's re-
quest that he work a total of thirty-one Sundays during 1977 and 1978.
In 1979, he informed his employer that he would no longer work on
Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath. He invoked the
protection of section 53-303e(b) of the General Statutes of Connecticut
which provided that: "No person who states that a particular day of the
week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work
on such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not
constitute grounds for his dismissal."'" Complying with the letter of the
statute, Caldor proposed that Thornton either move to Massachusetts (to
manage a department in a store which was closed on Sundays), or accept
a demotion to a lower paying, nonsupervisory position. Thornton re-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
7. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 144-153 and accompanying text.
9. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
10. Id. at 705 n.2.
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985). The statute additionally
provided:
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial occu-
pation or in the work of any industrial process to work more than six days in any
calendar week. An employee's refusal to work more than six days in any calendar
week shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection
(a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation
and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of
said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee
whole, including but not limited to reinstatement to his former or a comparable posi-
tion.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether the
applicant observes any Sabbath.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more
than two hundred dollars.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e (West 1985).
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jected both options and the store demoted him to a clerical position.
Thornton resigned two days later and filed a grievance with the Connect-
icut State Board of Mediation and Arbritration. x2 After an evidentiary
hearing, the Board found that Thornton's claim was sincere, that his de-
motion constituted constructive discharge, and that Caldor had thereby
violated the statute. The superior court affirmed, holding that the Con-
necticut statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 13
B. Majority Holdings
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed,14 concluding that the
statute violated the federal Establishment Clause under the test enunci-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.15 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed.16
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the statute violated all
three prongs of the Lemon test in that it lacked a clear secular purpose,
improperly advanced religion, and encouraged excessive entanglement
between church and state.' 7 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, however, fo-
cused only on the second prong of the Lemon standard, and held that the
statute exceeded the limitation proscribing a more than incidental or re-
mote effect of advancing religion. The Chief Justice wrote: "The statute
has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious
practice."'" The Burger majority concluded that "the Connecticut stat-
ute impose[d] on employers and employees an absolute duty to conform
their business practices to the particular religious practices of the em-
ployee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally
designates."' 9 This rigid scheme of rights, the Court decided, improperly
favored Sabbath observers.2 ° Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the Court
observed: "The First Amendment... gives no one the right to insist that
in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities." 2' In an accompanying footnote, the majority
implied that the religious rights of employees must be balanced against
12. 472 U.S. at 706-07.
13. Id. at 707.
14. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 351, 464 A.2d 785, 794 (1983).
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon v. Kurtzman provides that three tests must be met for a
statute to avoid violating the Establishment Clause: (1) the statute must have a secular pur-
pose; (2) the statute must not have a primary effect which advances or inhibits religion; and (3)
the statute must not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id. at
612-13.
16. 472 U.S. at 708.
17. 191 Conn. at 345-51, 464 A.2d at 792-94.
18. 472 U.S. at 710.
19. Id. at 709.
20. Id. at 709-10.
21. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
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the nonreligious rights of their coworkers.22
The majority also noted that the statute contained no provisions for
special circumstances, such as Friday Sabbath observance, nor did the
law provide special consideration for the possibility that a high percent-
age of the work force might choose the same day of worship. The statute
also failed to consider possible hardships to an employer who had to
make the required accommodations.23 In short, the state had given too
much weight to the concerns and interests of Sabbath observers.
C. The O'Connor-Marshall Concurrence
The concurrence of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Marshall,
accepted the majority's conclusion that the statute "impermissibly ad-
vance[d] religion."24 Justice O'Connor added, however, that the reli-
gious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196425 do not appear vulnerable to the same establishment clause analy-
sis." Justice O'Connor noted that Title VII, like the Connecticut statute,
"attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by private
employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifi-
cally contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause."27 Title VII's goal of
preventing discrimination represents a valid secular purpose, and its call
for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation of all religious beliefs
and practices suggests that the law would pass the requirements of the
Lemon test.28
II. Constitutional Analysis
The facts of Thornton suggest a clear free exercise issue: the right to
worship freely on one's Sabbath represents, to many people, a fundamen-
tal right of religious freedom. But the Free Exercise Clause is not men-
22. Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a par-
ticular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized as a day off. Other
employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a
weekend day off have no rights under the statute. For example, those employees who
have earned the privilege through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced
to surrender this privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of
"dues" at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute
right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a weekend day
off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not working, must take a back
seat to the Sabbath observer.
Id. at 710 n.9.
23. Id. at 709-10. This language appears to refer to the "reasonable accommodation" re-
quirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1967), which implements 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See infra notes
83-85 and accompanying text.
24. 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
26. 472 U.S. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
28. Id. See also infra note 153.
[Vol. 15:513
tioned explicitly in the majority opinion.29 To explore the reasons behind
this absence, a brief historical review is in order.
A. Historical Development
The United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. . . -"o These guarantees, known respectively as the "Estab-
lishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, were drafted at a time when the
concepts of state and religion were generally well defined and narrowly
limited.31 As evidenced by the debate in Congress over the proposed Bill
of Rights, the legislators were primarily concerned with preventing the
establishment of a single, national religion.32 Addressing themselves pri-
marily to this goal, the Framers of the First Amendment felt that indi-
vidual religious issues were to be resolved by the separate states.33
The Supreme Court initially adopted the founders' interpretation of
the First Amendment, allowing the states great latitude in regulating reli-
gious matters within their borders. In the first case to raise the free exer-
cise issue, Permoli v. First Municipality of New Orleans,34 a Catholic
29. Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the majority alluded to the Free Exercise Clause and
subordinated it to the Establishment Clause. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
The Court argued, in effect, that the free exercise right is limited when one's religious
practice intrudes upon the rights of others. A statute absolutely guaranteeing a right to free
exercise under such circumstances would serve to establish religion because it would have a
"primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice." 472 U.S. at 710.
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
31. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1154 (1988). Although Professor Tribe
does not explain what he means by "well defined and quite narrowly limited," he refers the
reader to an informative book on the subject. Id. at 1154 n.4. See A.P. STOKES AND L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1964). Stokes and Pfeffer chronicle
the "Official Acts and Utterances" of the founding fathers before, during, and after the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. Two themes emerge from Stokes' and Pfeffer's work which suggest a
basic consensus among the Framers as to the perception of church and state. First, the major-
ity of the founding fathers endorsed, and joined in, various public religious practices. Prayers,
thanksgivings, and fasts were not infrequent in that day. Prominent persons supporting these
national calls to worship included John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and
the Constitution's principal architect, James Madison. Second, the founders, while generally
opposed to the establishment of a single national church, see infra note 32 and accompanying
text, were less hostile to the establishment of various state churches within the separate states.
A.P. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra, 64-103.
32. One excerpt from these debates reads:
Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted before religion, it would
satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He believed that the people feared one sect
might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform. He thought if the word national was
introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to
prevent.
A.P. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 31, at 95.
33. Id. at 91-92.
34. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
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priest appealed a fine imposed on him for officiating at a funeral in viola-
tion of a New Orleans ordinance granting a monopoly to a certain
chapel. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the First
Amendment did not protect citizens from laws passed in their respective
states.35
The first signal that the federal government could indeed reach the
lives of individuals worshipping in their own states came in the so-called
"Mormon cases."36 In Reynolds v. United States,37 the Court held that
although the First Amendment prevented Congress from exercising
power over individual beliefs and opinions, religious practices were infer-
ior to the established laws of the land.3 1 In Davis v. Beason,39 the Court
wrote: "However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country. . . 4o
B. The Modern Standard: Everson v. Board of Education
A number of cases which have interpreted the first amendment reli-
gion clauses arose from the field of education and parochial schools.41 In
Everson v. Board of Education,42 the Court went far beyond the definition
of "establishment of religion" which had been employed by the drafters
of the Bill of Rights. 3 The Everson court stressed that the Establishment
35. Id. at 609-10. It should be noted that this case was decided prior to the adoption, in
1868, of the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically prohibits state interference with citi-
zens' enjoyment of federal statutory and constitutional guarantees. It is well settled today that
all first amendment guarantees are equally binding on state and federal governments. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1156; see also infra notes 42, 43 & 68.
36. The three "Mormon cases" are Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (reli-
gious polygamy in United States Territory held subject to congressional control); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Idaho Territory statute prohibiting polygamy and enacted pursu-
ant to legislative power given by United States Congress was upheld); and Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (Congress had power to repeal
act of incorporation of a church after church continued to advocate polygamy).
37. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
38. Id. at 166-67. In Reynolds, § 5352 of the Revised Statutes made bigamy a crime in
United States Territories.
39. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
40. Id. at 342-43. Although the actual law was passed by the Idaho Territorial Legisla-
ture, the legislature derived its power from congressional grant. Id. at 345-47.
41. See generally A.P. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 31, at 351-446; L. TRIBE, supra
note 31, at 1154-79.
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, a state statute authorized a school board to establish a
program which reimbursed parents for the cost of school bus transportation to public and
nonprofit private schools. The only nonprofit private school in the district was a Catholic
school. The Supreme Court upheld the program by a five to four vote.
43. The Everson Court's famous gloss on the Establishment Clause described in forceful
language the constitutionally required "wall of separation between church and State":
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
Clause required a "wall of separation" between church and state with
specific, rigid features.4 A year later, in McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,4" the Court reaffirmed the principle of strict separation between
church and state, which barred any form of direct aid to religion.46 The
Court concluded that the "wall of separation"'47 must be "kept high and
impregnable."48
Maintaining a "wall of separation" between church and state de-
mands continuous surveillance of the relations between secular and non-
secular groups.4 9  In contrast, the concept of religious neutrality
presumes that the state has religious citizens whose practices will be per-
mitted as long as any resulting entanglements with the state are de mini-
mus.5 0 Religious neutrality was reflected in the words of Justice Douglas
when he said: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."5 Religious neutrality can also be seen in the four cases
that upheld Sunday closing laws during the 1960 Supreme Court Term.52
Opponents of neutrality who advocate a "wall of separation" eschew any
form of government ties to religion for fear that one group may obtain a
more favorable status than others. Because the Establishment Clause
more directly addresses this issue of possible governmental favoritism, it
is implicitly favored by those who believe in a "wall of separation."
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any reli-
gious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."
330 U.S. at 15-16 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
44. See supra note 43.
45. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
46. Id. at 209-12.
47. This phrase was reportedly offered first by Thomas Jefferson in reply to an address to
him by the Dansbury Baptist Association. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting 8 JEFF. WORKS
113).
48. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
49. For a general discussion of the logical tension inherent in the language and jurispru-
dence of the religion clauses, see L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1154-1301.
50. W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 22-24 (1964).
51. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
52. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Massachusetts Sunday clos-
ing law not violative of First and Fourteenth Amendments); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961) (Pennsylvania Sunday closing law did not violate First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (Pennsylvania closing
law did not violate First and Fourteenth Amendments); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (Maryland Sunday closing law did not violate Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
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C. The Tension Between the Clauses
In Zorach v. Clauson, 3 the Supreme Court noted that the Constitu-
tion does not require government hostility toward religion.54 Nonethe-
less, the Everson interpretation of the Establishment Clause has remained
firmly entrenched.5 This interpretation has exacerbated tension between
the religion clauses. As Justice Frankfurter has noted: "[I]n view of the
competition among religious creeds, whatever 'establishes' one sect dis-
advantages another, and vice versa."56 Justice Douglas added: "The re-
verse side of an 'establishment' is a burden on the 'free exercise' of
religion."57
This tension has been increased by America's high degree of reli-
gious diversity. As Justice Brennan has pointed out:
Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, in-
cluding as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and
Jews but as well as of those who worship according to no version of
the Bible and those who worship no God at all. In the face of such
profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to
no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly
offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers
alike. 58
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, originally drafted as
complementary devices for protecting religious minorities and restraining
religious majorities, are now at odds with each other.59 The Establish-
ment Clause, as currently interpreted, provides that when a statute or
other government act supports the religious practices of any one group,
whether a minority or majority, the threat of establishment is raised.'
53. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
54. The Court observed: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being . . . [W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effec-
tive scope of religious influence." Id. at 313-14.
55. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court adopted an even
more limited view of permissible interaction between church and state than had been asserted
in the Everson majority opinion. The Schempp Court adopted the following portion of Justice
Rutledge's dissent in Everson:
The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official estab-
lishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as
had prevailed in England and some of the colonies .... The object was broader than
separating church and state.... It was to create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbid-
ding every form of public aid or support for religion.
Id. at 217 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
56. McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 463 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 578 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-41 (footnote and citation omit-
ted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
60. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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Government action designed to assure persons, an opportunity to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences, in support of free religious
exercise, arguably violates the Establishment Clause. Thus, if religious
persons obtain government assistance to secure their religious rights
against an uncooperative employer, they run the risk that the Court will
minimize their rights to avoid establishing religion. 6
D. The Problem of State Action
Faced with this tension, the Supreme Court appears to have aban-
doned any attempt to harmonize the religion clauses.62 Instead, the
Court decides cases on the basis of one clause or the other, depending on
which clause is triggered by the challenged state action. The need for
state action to raise the constitutional issue makes it highly unlikely that
both clauses will be construed together.
Because the religion clauses are enforceable only against the state or
federal governments,63 some specific governmental action must be chal-
lenged to invoke the constitutional guarantee. 64 That specific action can-
not simultaneously harm an employer's interest in preventing an
establishment of religion and infringe on the employee's free exercise
right.65 Without such a coinciding of legal issues, it is highly unlikely
that the two clauses will be construed together.6 6 The Court then will
limit its analysis to the single clause that is offended by the state action.
For example, in Thornton, the Court found proreligious state action in
61. This was precisely the result in Thornton. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying
text.
62. See Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship between the "Establishment" and
"Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142, 149 (1963).
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1688-1720; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421-50 (1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
64. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1688-1720; see also J. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 421-
50.
65. The Free Exercise Clause, while protective of religious freedom, is only a restraint on
governmental action. The wording of the clause forbids governmental intrusion on free exer-
cise of religion; it does not impose an affirmative duty on government to promote or protect
free exercise in the face of intrusions into that freedom by private parties. A case involving first
amendment issues cannot be brought unless there is state action. For a complete analysis of
the concept of state action, see L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1688-1720. See also J. NOWAK,
supra note 63, at 421-50. Thus, if the government action arguably offended a defendant's
interest under the Establishment Clause (as did the statute in Thornton), it is highly unlikely
the same action would offend the plaintiff's interest under the Free Exercise Clause.
66. The Supreme Court, if it wanted to take up the challenge, could construe the two
clauses together in dual appeals. For example, while Caldor was the party to raise the Estab-
lishment Clause issue in Thornton, Thornton arguably could have appealed the state high
court's ruling on the establishment clause issue by claiming that ruling constituted state action
in violation of his free exercise rights. The United States Supreme Court then could analyze
the case as raising both religion clauses in the context of two instances of state action: the
enactment of the Connecticut statute and the ruling of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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the Connecticut statute, and therefore relied exclusively on establishment
clause analysis.67 The Court could not, however, address Thornton's free
exercise concerns because his employer was a private party who stood
outside the reach of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.6"
The case of Sherbert v. Verner provides an example of the Supreme
Court's focus on the Free Exercise Clause.6 9 In 1957, Sherbert converted
to the Seventh Day Adventist faith which preserves Saturday as a day of
rest. In 1959, Sherbert's employer switched from a five-day to a seven-
day work week. When Sherbert refused to work on Saturdays she was
fired. Unable to find a new job, she applied to the state of South Carolina
for unemployment compensation benefits. She was denied these benefits
for failing to accept suitable work without "good cause."70 The only
"suitable work" offered would have required that she work on Saturdays.
Reversing the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Court found that this
denial of benefits constituted state action, and held that the denial was an
unconstitutional burden on the free exercise rights of the appellant.7
The Supreme Court's different approaches to the religion issues
raised in Thornton and Sherbert illustrate the apparent reluctance of the
Court to provide guidance that might interrelate in some principled man-
ner the different policies behind the two religion clauses. In Thornton,
the Court also might have analyzed the question of whether the Connect-
icut Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the Board and the supe-
rior court, impermissibly infringed on Thornton's free exercise rights. In
Sherbert, the Court might also have analyzed the issue of whether pay-
ments of unemployment compensation would impermissibly advance
Sherbert's religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. In both
cases, the Court engaged in a narrow and apparently selective discussion
of the particular religion clause triggered by the challenged state action.
This narrow approach leaves open fundamental-and perhaps unanswer-
able-constitutional questions concerning the boundary between govern-
ment's proper accommodation of individual religious needs and its
improper support of specific religions.
In view of the "wall of separation" rule,7 2 with its greater sensitivity
to the Establishment Clause than to the Free Exercise Clause,7" and
given the tension between the clauses74 and the tendency of state action
67. 472 U.S. 703, 708-10 (1985). See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
68. The first amendment religion clauses were made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
69. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
70. Id. at 399-401.
71. Id. at 409-10.
72. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text following note 52.
74. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
to trigger an analysis under one clause only," it is clear that the free
exercise dilemma faced by employees like Thornton76 is unlikely to find
favorable resolution under federal constitutional analysis.77 As Justice
O'Connor suggests in Thornton, however, relief is available under the
federal antidiscrimination laws found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.78
HI. Title VII Antidiscrimination
A. The Statute and its Early Interpretation
As part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2000e prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7 9 This law is the only federal statute affecting Sabbath
rights in the workplace." Subsection (2)(a) of section 2000e defines
those employment practices which are unlawful and discriminatory."'
During the three years immediately following its enactment, section
2000e was litigated infrequently. 2 The Equal Employmment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), charged with enforcing the new statute, devel-
oped guidelines to aid in its application. 3 These guidelines noted that
several complaints had been filed with the EEOC which raised the ques-
tion of whether or not it was considered discrimination to discharge or
refuse to hire employees who regularly observed a particular Sabbath.
The EEOC determined that the employer's duty not to discriminate in-
75. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
77. State constitutional analysis in this area is also of no avail since state high courts
consistently interpret their state constitutions' religion clauses, which are similar or identical to
the First Amendment, in accordance with federal first amendment law. See, e.g., Lane v.
McFadyen, 259 Ala. 205, 66 So. 2d 83 (1953).
78. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
80. See, U.S.C. Index (1982).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1985) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
82. For the period between 1964 and 1966, the only reported cases which deal with the
statute are the following: Sarfaty v. Nowak, 369 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966); Local 12, United
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Building and Constr.
Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mo. 1966); and Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
260 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tenn. 1966).
83. The first set of guidelines was adopted in 1966 as EEOC Regulation 1605. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605 (1966). The guidelines were amended a year later. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1967).
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cluded an obligation to make reasonable accommodations for the reli-
gious needs of employees. 4 Such accommodation, however, should not
involve undue hardship for the employer. The EEOC further required
the employer to carry the burden of showing when the accommodation
resulted in undue hardship.85
The first case to interpret section 2000e and the EEOC religious dis-
crimination guidelines with regard to Sunday worship was Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Company.86 Having refused to work on Sundays be-
cause of his religious beliefs, Dewey agreed to obtain replacements for
the Sundays he was scheduled to work. After eight months, Dewey de-
cided it was a sin to ask others to work in his place. On September 4,
1966, Dewey refused to work or to find a replacement. He was given a
warning and a disciplinary layoff lasting three days. After a similar re-
fusal on September 11, 1966, Dewey was fired.87
After several unsuccessful efforts to obtain relief through his union
and two government agencies, Dewey filed a complaint with the EEOC.
The EEOC authorized filing of suit in district court despite the regional
director's belief that there was no probable cause to support the discrimi-
nation claim. 8 In a memorandum opinion, the district court ruled in
favor of Dewey, ordering reinstatement with back pay, and issuing an
injunction which prevented Reynolds from requiring Dewey to work
Sundays. 9
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,9" holding that Dewey
had not been discharged because of his religion, but because he had vio-
lated his union's collective bargaining agreement.91 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and a four-to-four split upheld the lower court's
decision.92
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1605, 1605.2(b)(1) (1967).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (1967).
86. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
87. Id. at 327-29.
88. Id. at 327.
89. Id. at 328
90. Id. at 332.
91. Id. at 330. The court of appeals held that the older EEOC guidelines controlled
Dewey's case. These guidelines assisted employers who operated on Saturdays and Sundays.
Former § 1605.1(b) stated in part:
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable over-
time requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer to discriminate
on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or
having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious
obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accom-
modate his religious needs.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)(3) (1966). This subsection was deleted from the 1967 EEOC guidelines,
leaving the matter to the ad hoc discretion of the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1967).
92. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The split decision was due to
Justice Harlan's absence from the vote. The decision is reported without an opinion.
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Two principal issues arose from the Dewey case. First, Judge
Combs, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit majority, minimized the signifi-
cance of the collective bargaining agreement, and emphasized the first
amendment right to freedom of religion as one of the Bill of Rights'
strongest mandates 93 . Judge Combs argued that the "cornerstone" of
both the 1966 and 1967 guidelines94 was that employers were to accom-
modate the religious needs of employees "where such accommodations
can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."95 As future cases soon demonstrated, the question of what
constitutes undue hardship to an employer became a principal issue in
this area of section 2000e litigation.96
A second issue raised by Dewey relates to the weight to be given to
EEOC regulations. The Dewey majority remarked in a footnote: "The
authority of the EEOC to adopt a regulation interfering with the internal
affairs of an employer, absent discrimination, may well be doubted. '97
One year later, an Arkansas federal district court further explored the
authority of the EEOC regulations in Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson.98
The Kettell court observed: "The failure to alflrmatively accommodate
an employee to the extent suggested by EEOC regulation cannot be
equated with 'discrimination'." 99 The court concluded that Congress
had not intended to impose on employers such a broad duty to accom-
modate employees under section 2000e. 1°°
B. The 1972 Amendment to 42 U.S.C. section 2000e
Less than a year after the Kettell decision, Congress explicitly ex-
panded the duties of an employer by amending the statute to include a
new provision. New subsection (j) provides: "The term 'religion' in-
cludes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accom-
modate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."" 0 '
The first case to apply the revised statute was Riley v. Bendix
93. 429 F.2d at 334 (Combs, I., dissenting).
94. See supra note 91.
95. 429 F.2d at 333 (Combs, J., dissenting).
96. See, eg., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) (see infra notes 113-126 and accompanying text); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464
F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (see infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text); Shaffield v. North-
rop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (see infra notes 105-108
and accompanying text).
97. 429 F.2d at 331 n.I.
98. 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
99. Id. at 895.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982).
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Corp.' o2 Riley had refused to work between sundown Friday and sun-
down Saturday for religious reasons. His employer decided that main-
taining uniform treatment of its employees was a valid reason to refuse
any special accommodations for Riley. 0 3 Noting the recent amendment
of section 2000e, the court held that the employer had failed to demon-
strate that it was unable to accommodate Riley's religious observances
without undue hardship to its business."w
In Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., 0s Shaf-
field had been discharged for refusing to work between sundown Friday
and sundown Saturday. The employer argued that Shaffield's refusal to
work created undue hardship by disrupting the company's seniority sys-
tem. Rejecting this argument, the court observed that management had
not contacted Shatfield to attempt a reasonable accommodation.10 6 The
court held that the employer was guilty of religious discrimination and
ordered reinstatement with back pay.10 7 The court concluded that under
the statute an employer has an affnmative duty to prove either that a
reasonable accommodation was made, or that the burden of such accom-
modation was not reasonable under the circumstances. °10
In 1975, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of another
religious employee. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,'0 9 the employer ar-
gued that the reasonable accommodation rule violated the Establishment
Clause. The Sixth Circuit rejected this view and reversed the lower
court, holding that the employer had failed to demonstrate undue hard-
ship."0 The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that sec-
tion 2000e violates the three prongs of the Lemon v. Kurtzman ' test,
and thus advances the religion of Sabbath observers. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari but one Supreme Court justice was absent from the
vote and a four-to-four split upheld the lower court's ruling." 2
C. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison
In 1977, the Supreme Court fully considered revised section 2000e
in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison."3 Hardison abruptly ended the
102. 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
103. Id. at 1115.
104. Id. at 1118.
105. 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
106. Id. at 943-44.
107. Id. at 944-45.
108. Id. at 944.
109. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
110. Id. at 551. After reversing the lower court's judgment, the appellate court remanded,
suggesting that the district court consider reinstatement with back pay and attorney's fees. Id.
at 554.
111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) See supra note 15.
112. 429 U.S. 65 (1976). The absent justice was Justice Stevens.
113. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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trend of decisions favoring employees. In 1968, Hardison converted to
the Worldwide Church of God which espoused Saturday as its day of
rest. Hardison requested that TWA relieve him of Saturday shift assign-
ments, and the company complied. Hardison later agreed to work in a
different location which maintained a separate seniority list. His superior
at the new location asked Hardison to work on Saturdays. He refused
and was fired.114
Hardison sued for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2
and the 1967 EEOC guidelines. The district court held that TWA had
satisfied its "reasonable accommodation" obligation, and that further
concessions would constitute undue hardship to the company.1 15 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that TWA had not satisfied its duty to
accommodate Hardison.'
16
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision.1 17 The
Court noted that the 1967 EEOC guidelines did not specify what consti-
tutes "reasonable accommodation" or "undue hardship" to an em-
ployer. 1 8 Because neither the EEOC nor Congress had clarified these
standards, the Court developed its own definition of these terms stating
that a duty to accommodate was secondary to a previously established
seniority system and anything more than a de minimus cost was undue
hardship to the employer. 1
19
Applying these newly developed standards, the Court concluded
that TWA's efforts to accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs were rea-
sonable under the 1967 EEOC guidelines.1"' Of special importance to
the Court was the TWA seniority system, which raised the problem that
a particularly deferential accommodation of Hardison's religious needs
would constitute discrimination against Hardison's fellow employees.
121
Reasoning that a trade-off of employee rights was at issue, the Court
insisted on "clear statutory language" to establish Congressional intent
to defer to the religious employee. 122 The Court concluded that "to re-
114. Id. at 66-70.
115. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33, 40, 42 (8th Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 39.
117. 432 U.S. at 85.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Id. at 75-85.
120. Id. at 77.
121. The seniority system created rights and priorities among the employees which in-
cluded rights to time off and shift preferences for more senior workers. This system would be
undermined, and senior workers would suffer discrimination, the Court decided, if junior
workers could claim for religious reasons time-off privileges otherwise due only senior employ-
ees. Id. at 80-81.
122. The Court wrote:
TWA was not required by Title VII to carve out a special exception to the sen-
iority system in order to help Hardison meet his religious obligations .... In the
absence of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, we will not
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quire TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order to give Hardi-
son Saturdays off is an undue hardship."' 12 3
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, claiming that the Hardi-
son decision constituted a "fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices."' 12 4 The dissent-
ers seemed to argue that the majority had reduced the statute to mean-
ingless rhetoric and prevented religious employees from receiving even
minor privileges required by their religious faith. 12  The dissenters con-
cluded that the statute could require employers to grant privileges to reli-
gious persons as part of the accommodation process without violating the
Establishment Clause. 2 6
D. The EEOC Response to Hardison
The Court's charge that Congress and the EEOC had failed to de-
fine "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" brought a
prompt response. In 1978, the EEOC conducted public hearings con-
cerning questions raised by the Hardison decision. 127 The EEOC con-
cluded from the hearings that confusion was widespread concerning the
extent of accommodation required under the Hardison decision, and that
certain employee religious practices were not being accommodated prop-
erly. 1 28 Such practices included the observance of a Sabbath and reli-
gious holidays, prayer breaks, special dietary requirements, and time off
to mourn a deceased relative. Also neglected were beliefs concerning
medical examinations, union membership, and dress and grooming hab-
its. 29 The EEOC found, in addition, that many employers had indepen-
dently developed viable methods of accommodating religious practices
and that such accommodation generally did not result in unfavorable
business consequences.1 30 Based on these findings, the EEOC revised its
readily construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against some em-
ployees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath.
Id. at 85.
123. Id. at 84.
124. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 91. Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]his Court has repeatedly found no Establishment Clause problems in exempt-
ing religious observers from state-imposed duties .... If the State does not establish
religion over nonreligion by excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed
the state, I do not see how the State can be said to establish religion by requiring
employers to do the same with respect to obligations owed the employer. Thus, I
think it beyond dispute that the Act does-and, consistently with the First Amend-
ment, can-require employers to grant privileges to religious observers as part of the
accommodation process.
Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1605, app. A at 161 (1987).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
528 [Vol. 15:513
SABBATH RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE
guidelines to clarify the accommodation obligation.13 1
Section 1605.2 of the new guidelines directly refers to and expands
on the Hardison decision. Subsection (e)(1) explains the "undue hard-
ship" requirement under the category of "Cost": "An employer may as-
sert undue hardship to justify a refusal to accommodate an employee's
need to be absent from his or her scheduled duty hours if the employer
can demonstrate that the accommodation would require 'more than a de
minimus cost.' 132 While the regular payment of premium wages to a
substitute employee would represent more than a de minimus cost, the
employer should bear the burden of an occasional payment of premimum
wages and of general administrative costs.1 3 Violating a bona fide sen-
iority system to protect one employee's religious practice constitutes un-
due hardship if such accommodation denies another employee a
preferred shift guaranteed under the system. 134 However, voluntary sub-
stitutions and shift swaps are arrangements that an employer actively
should pursue. 13' The EEOC also suggested that an employer could pro-
vide reasonable accommodation through flexible scheduling' 36 or lateral
transfers and changes of job assignments.137
Although determining whether an accommodation is reasonable or
unreasonable under section 2000e has remained difficult under the new
federal guidelines, the courts have begun to develop useful formulas. In
an early case decided under the new EEOC guidelines, the Fifth Circuit
held that an employee should explore scheduling or voluntary shift as-
signments before demanding that the employer make accommoda-
tions. 138 In 1983, a federal district court in Texas declined to require
that an employer guarantee a worker every Sabbath off, as the regular
payment of substitute employees during the worker's occasional assign-
ments to peak work periods would constitute undue hardship. 139
Courts are more receptive to claims by employees who express a
willingness to give up work-related benefits in exchange for work-free
Sabbaths. In Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education,"4 an employee
suggested that he be allowed to use his personal business leaves for reli-
gious observances. The employer insisted on an alternative solution
which involved a loss of pay to the employee. The Second Circuit Court
131. Id. Completed in 1980, these revisions replaced the previous guidelines found at 29
C.F.R. §§ 1605-1605.1.
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1987).
133. Id.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2) (1987).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i) (1987).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(ii) (1987).
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(iii) (1987).
138. Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982).
139. Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 573 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
140. 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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of Appeals held that when both employee and employer propose reason-
able accommodation plans, section 2000e requires that the employer ac-
cept the employee's proposal unless the accommodation would impose
undue hardship on the employer's business.14
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case under the new EEOC
regulations. However, Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in
Thornton,142 stressed that the majority's invalidation of the Connecticut
statute under the Establishment Clause did not threaten the religious ac-
commodation provisions of section 2000e: "Since Title VII calls for rea-
sonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends that
requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting
only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective observer would per-
ceive it as an antidiscrimination law rather than [as] an endorsement of
• . .a particular religious practice." '43
E. Religious Employees' Rights Under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e
In balancing the competing interests of employer and employee by
means of formulas defining "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship", 42 U.S.C. section 2000e has achieved its own "reasonable ac-
commodation" between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses-a
result which thus far has eluded the Supreme Court under strict interpre-
tation of the First Amendment. 1" Under section 2000e, employers may
reasonably accommodate the religious observances of employees, short of
imposing undue hardship on the employer or on fellow employees. 45
This opportunity for free religious exercise-the secondary result of a
congressional policy directly aimed at preventing discrimination ' 6-- is
broader than any free exercise right that could be granted directly by
Congress or a state. Thornton clearly illustrates the shortcomings of leg-
islative efforts to guarantee free religious exercise directly.14 7
Conclusion
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Supreme Court focused on
the Establishment Clause in relation to denying a religious employee the
right to be free from work on his Sabbath. This Comment has suggested
that this result occurred because current first amendment jurisprudence,
which emphasizes the need for a "wall of separation" between Church
and State, implicitly subordinates the Free Exercise Clause to the Estab-
141. Id. at 484.
142. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanyng text.
143. 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. See supra notes 9-23, 30-77 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 79-141 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 81 and text accompanying note 101.
147. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
lishment Clause.14 For this and other reasons inherent in the tension
between the clauses14 9 and the need for state action, 150 the Supreme
Court is unlikely to interpret the clauses together, or to supply principled
reasons for invoking one clause rather than the other in situations in
which both clauses are implicated and suggest conflicting results. At
present, there is no constututional right enabling a religious employee to
insist on enjoying his or her Sabbath as a day of rest.
Justice O'Connor's Thornton concurrence suggests that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (specifically, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e) may
provide a statutory resolution of this dilemma when constitutional analy-
sis fails.151 An exploration of Justice O'Connor's suggestion and the case
law and EEOC regulations in this area'52 indicates that section 2000e
presents a valuable source of rights for employees seeking reasonable ac-
commodation of their religious practices from their public or private em-
ployers. As Thornton illustrates, the Establishment Clause may pit the
judiciary against the legislature when the legislature's goal is to protect
the free exercise of religion. The key to the success of section 2000e is the
use of the word and concept of "discrimination." Both the legislature
and the courts are strongly committed to eliminating this social evil. The
tension between these two branches of government is largely avoided
when a denial of free exercise is framed as a form of discrimination.
Thus, the religious antidiscrimination goal of Title VII closely parallels
the original object of the Free Exercise Clause, while it avoids establish-
ment clause complication.
53
If the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are ever construed
together, the "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" stan-
dards developed under section 2000e could provide a useful analytical
model. In determining employee rights, religious practices should be ac-
commodated to a point short of creating undue hardship to the other
parties involved. As the freedom of religion is a fundamental right, the
burden of showing hardship should rest upon those who oppose the free
exercise of religion.
148. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text, and infra note 153.
152. See supra notes 83-147 and accompanying text.
153. Justice O'Connor, in her Thornton concurrence, suggested that § 2000e would survive
establishment clause analysis because of the strong secular policy condemning discrimination:
[A] statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring employment opportu-
nity to all groups in our pluralistic society .... I believe an objective observer would
perceive it as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a
particular religious practice.
472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In the meantime, those who find themselves in a position similar to
Thornton's would be well advised to avoid seeking redress though the
First Amendment, and instead concentrate on the relief afforded by the
provisions of section 2000e.
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